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Abstract
Redistribution mechanisms have been proposed for more ef-
ficient resource allocation but not for profit. We consider re-
distribution mechanism design for the first time in a setting
where participants are connected and the resource owner is
only aware of her neighbours. In this setting, to make the re-
source allocation more efficient, the resource owner has to
inform the others who are not her neighbours, but her neigh-
bours do not want more participants to compete with them.
Hence, the goal is to design a redistribution mechanism such
that participants are incentivized to invite more participants
and the resource owner does not earn or lose much money
from the allocation. We first show that existing redistribution
mechanisms cannot be directly applied in the network setting
to achieve the goal. Then we propose a novel network-based
redistribution mechanism such that all participants in the net-
work are invited, the allocation is more efficient and the re-
source owner has no deficit.
Introduction
The problem of resource allocation has recently caught the
public imagination, where the resource owner has to decide
the allocation of the item among a group of self-interested
agents. Since the valuation differs from agents, it is a natural
objective for the owner to pursue the efficiency of the allo-
cation, i.e., allocating the item to the agent with the highest
valuation. In many scenarios, the owner does not really aim
at making profits but hopes the wealth maintained among the
agents. For example, the government wants to build a library
in a community that values it most; a charity distributes a do-
nation to the recipient who needs it most; a hospital allocates
doctors to rural areas where doctors are highly demanded.
To find the agent with the highest valuation, one com-
mon alternative is to hold an auction (Krishna 2009) un-
der some protocols such as the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971;
Groves 1973). However, the payments under VCG will all
be delivered to the auctioneer, which againsts our non-profit
purpose. To maintain as much wealth as possible among
the participants, many redistribution mechanisms based on
VCG have been proposed (Cavallo 2006; Guo 2011). They
redistribute the revenue generated by VCG back to all par-
ticipants. However, these mechanisms can only be applied
in static settings, where the resource owner can only allo-
cate the item to the person whom she can directly contact
with (her neighbours).
Accordingly, another issue emerges: how can the owner
enroll more participants in the resource allocation problem
in order to achieve a more efficient allocation? Advertising
is a widely used method to disseminate information to attract
more people. However, it should be paid in advance without
a guarantee that there will be more participants or a more
efficient allocation. Moreover, it is irrational for a resource
owner who no longer cares about profit to pay something for
the allocation. Therefore, in this paper, we consider a cost-
free promotion by incentivizing participants to invite their
neighbours in social networks (Easley and Kleinberg 2010),
which is an enormous challenge as no one would be willing
to invite more competitors without a profit.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel network-
based redistribution mechanism to tackle this challenge,
where the reward redistributed to each agent is a mono-
tone increasing function to the number of participants she
invites. Although the agents are not paid in advance, they
are still incentivized not only to report their valuation truth-
fully but also to diffuse the information to all their neigh-
bours without sacrificing the non-deficit guarantee, which is
one of the key features of our mechanism. Eventually, more
agents will be informed about the resource allocation and a
more efficient allocation will be achieved. Moreover, it also
satisfies the desirable properties of traditional redistribution
mechanisms such as individual rationality and asymptoti-
cally budget-balance.
Some interesting work related to information diffusion via
networks has been studied recently. Li et al. (2017) proposed
an auction mechanism where the seller sells one item in a
social network with the help of that participants are inviting
each other to attract more participants. With this inspiration,
soon afterwards Zhao et al. (2018) generalized the mecha-
nism for multiple homogeneous items in the same setting.
Their attention is on how to maximize the seller’s revenue,
which is different from ours. We aim for a more efficient
allocation without profits. We refer to the idea of their work
and design our redistribution mechanism to achieve the goal.
There exists a rich literature on redistribution mechanisms
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for resource allocation problems (Guo 2019; Moulin 2009;
Gujar and Narahari 2011; Guo 2012). Furthermore, redistri-
bution mechanisms have also been extended to the setting
of public project problems (Guo et al. 2011; Naroditskiy et
al. 2012; Guo et al. 2013; Guo 2019). However, none of
the work took the natural connections between participants
into account. More to the point, our mechanism promises de-
sirable properties when participants are connected via their
private links which cannot be achieved by the existing mech-
anisms.
We claim our three main contributions here. First, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the very first to study
the redistribution mechanism design problem in social net-
works. Second, we show the limitations of the classical
Cavallo mechanism if it is directly extended in social net-
works. Third, we propose a novel network-based redistribu-
tion mechanism which improves the efficiency of the alloca-
tion without sacrificing all the desirable properties.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. We first
describe the background and basic definitions of the prob-
lem. Next, we extend the Cavallo mechanism in social net-
works and discuss its limitations. After that, we propose our
network-based redistribution mechanism for the tree struc-
tures and show its outstanding properties. Finally, we gener-
alize our mechanism in graphs and discuss future work.
Preliminaries
We consider a setting where an owner o wants to allocate
an item in a social network G = (V,E), where each agent
i ∈ V is a potential bidder with a private valuation vi ≥ 0
for the item. Each agent i ∈ V ∪{o} has a private neighbour
set ri ⊆ V . If there exists a directed edge e(i, j) ∈ E from
agent i to agent j, we say j is i’s neighbour, denoted by
j ∈ ri. Let di be the depth of agent i ∈ V , which is the
length of the shortest path from the owner to i. We say agent
j is agent i’s child neighbour if j ∈ ri and dj = di + 1,
denoted by j ∈ rci . The objective of the owner is to allocate
the item to the agent with the highest valuation to the best of
her ability and maintain as much wealth as possible among
the agents. That is, she is aiming to minimize the surplus of
the payment transfers in the mechanism.
Initially, without any third-party platforms, the owner can
only allocate the item to her neighbours since all the other
agents cannot be reached directly. To attract more potential
bidders, a feasible approach is to ask the agents to invite their
neighbours to join the allocation. However, there is no rea-
son for these bidders to invite more competitors. Thus, how
to design the incentives for the agents to propagate the infor-
mation without sacrificing desirable properties is the greatest
challenge we need to overcome.
In this paper, we propose a novel network-based redistri-
bution mechanism, where all the agents are willing to not
only report their private valuation for the item but also invite
all their neighbours to the mechanism voluntarily.
We start by defining some notations in the mechanism:
• Let θi = (vi, ri) be the type of agent i ∈ V , which is
i’s true private information.
• Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) = (θ−i, θi) be the type profile of
all the agents, where θ−i is the type profile for agents
except i.
• Let Θi be the type space for agent i ∈ V and Θ =
(Θ1, . . . ,Θn) = (Θ−i,Θi) be the type profile space
for all the agents.
• Let θˆi = (vˆi, rˆi) be the reported type of agent i ∈ V ,
where vˆi is the valuation she reported and rˆi is the
neighbours she has invited. Let θˆi = nil, if agent i is
not invited.
• Let G(θˆ) = (V (θˆ), E(θˆ)) be the graph constructed by
the reported type profile θˆ.
Note that the reported type is not definitely the same as
the true type. Therefore, we can easily observe that for each
agent i ∈ V , {
θˆi 6= nil if i ∈ V (θˆ)
θˆi = nil if i 6∈ V (θˆ)
Definition 1. A redistribution mechanism M in the so-
cial network is defined by an allocation policy pi =
(pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) and a payment policy p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn),
where pii : Θ→ {0, 1} and pi : Θ→ R.
Given a reported type profile θˆ, the payment pol-
icy p(θˆ) = (p1(θˆ), . . . , pn(θˆ)) represents the money
paid by each agent and the allocation policy pi(θˆ) =
(pi1(θˆ), . . . , pin(θˆ)) represents the item allocation result. In-
tuitively, we have{
pi(θˆ) ≥ 0 if agent i pays pi to the owner
pi(θˆ) < 0 if agent i receives −pi from the owner
pii(θˆ) =
{
1 if the item is allocated to agent i
0 if the item is not allocated to agent i
In our setting, we assume that there is no cost for an
agent to spread the information to her neighbours. There-
fore, given a reported type profile θˆ of all the agents, the
utility of agent i ∈ V with type θi and reported type θˆi is
defined as:
ui(θi, θˆ) = pii(θˆ)vi − pi(θˆ)
Therefore, the surplus of the payment transfer of the
mechanism is defined as:
S(θˆ) =
∑
i∈V pi(θˆ)
Definition 2. We say a reported type profile is feasible if for
each agent i ∈ V with θˆi 6= nil, there must exist at least one
path from the owner to i in G(θˆ). We say an allocation pi(θˆ)
is feasible if at most one agent i with θˆi 6= nil is allocated
the item, i.e.,
∑
i∈V,θˆi 6=nil pii(θˆ) = 1.
In the following discussion, we only focus on feasible
type profiles and feasible allocations since infeasible cases
will not happen in real-world application. Let F(θ) ⊆ Θ be
the set of all feasible reported type profiles.
Definition 3. Given a feasible reported type profile θˆ ∈
F(θ) and a feasible allocation pi, the social welfare of al-
location pi(θˆ) is defined by SW (θˆ) =
∑
i∈V pii(θˆ)v
′
i.
That is, the social welfare of an allocation is the sum of
the valuations of all agents who win the item for this alloca-
tion. The higher the social welfare is, the more efficient the
allocation is.
Definition 4. A redistribution mechanism M = (pi, p) is
individual rational (IR) if for all i ∈ V , all θ ∈ Θ and all
θˆ ∈ F(θ), we have ui(θi, θˆ) ≥ 0, where θˆi = (vi, rˆi).
This is a general extension of the traditional definition of
individual rationality. That is, all the agents participated in
the mechanism will not have negative utilities as long as she
truthfully reports her private valuation. Note that the defini-
tion does not require the agents to invite all their neighbours,
which loosens the restriction of reporting true type.
Definition 5. A redistribution mechanism M = (pi, p) is
incentive compatible (IC) if for all i ∈ V , all θ ∈ Θ and all
θˆ, θˆ′ ∈ F(θ), we have ui(θi, θˆ) ≥ ui(θi, θˆ′), where θˆi = θi
and θˆ′i 6= θi. θˆ′ is the corresponding reported type profile
when i changes her reported type such that the reported type
of any agent i 6∈ V (θˆ′) is nil and the others are the same as
those in θˆ.
For the traditional definition of incentive compatibility, all
the buyers’ dominant strategy is to truthfully report their pri-
vate valuation of the item. Here, we put forward a stricter ex-
tended definition of IC for the network setting, where all the
agents are incentivized not only to report valuation truthfully
but also to invite all their neighbours.
Definition 6. A redistribution mechanism M = (pi, p) is
non-deficit (ND) if for all i ∈ V , all θ ∈ Θ and all θˆ ∈
F(θ), we have S(θˆ) = ∑i∈V pi(θˆ) ≥ 0.
That is, the surplus of the payment transfer is non-
negative, which is reasonable because the owner or other
outside parties has to pay for the deficit otherwise.
Definition 7. A redistribution mechanism M = (pi, p) is
asymptotically budget-balanced (ABB) if for all i ∈ V , all
θ ∈ Θ and all θˆ ∈ F(θ), we have lim
|N |→+∞
S(θˆ) = 0.
This is to say when the number of the participants goes to
infinity, almost all the money received by the owner will be
redistributed back to the participants.
Cavallo Mechanism in Social Networks
Considering the constraint of generalized IR, extended IC,
ND and ABB, seemingly some traditional redistribution
mechanisms can be easily applied to the new setting in so-
cial networks. Therefore, in this section, we first review the
classical Cavallo mechanism (Cavallo 2006) and show that
it may lead to a deficit and disincentivize agents to diffuse
the information.
The Cavallo mechanism modifies the VCG framework
and redistributes the transfer payments back among the
agents while keeping the specified desirable properties of
VCG. The mechanism for a single item is outlined below:
Cavallo Mechanism
1. Each agent i ∈ V submits her reported type θˆi =
(vˆi, rˆi), which forms a feasible type profile θˆ ∈
F(θ).
2. The mechanism chooses the highest bidder w ∈
arg maxi∈V vˆi as the winner, which maximizes the
social welfare, and allocates the item to her.
3. All the agents’ payments are defined by pi(θˆ) =
pV CGi (θˆ) − prei (θˆ), where pV CGi (θˆ) = SW (θˆ−i) −
(SW (θˆ)−pii(θˆ)vˆi) is the money paid for auction and
prei (θˆ) =
SV CGi
n is the money redistributed to i.
4. The surplus of the mechanism which is given to the
item owner is S(θˆ) =
∑
i∈V pi(θˆ).
Intuitively, the Cavallo mechanism can be viewed as two
stages: the auction stage and the redistribution stage. In the
first auction stage, the item will be allocated to the high-
est bidder and she pays the loss of other players because of
her participation to the owner as defined in the traditional
VCG mechanism. Then in the second redistribution stage,
the owner redistributes the money received to all the agents
in the mechanism. The money redistributed to agent i is cal-
culated by S
V CG
i
n , where S
V CG
i is the surplus lower-bound
in VCG among the same agents over all possible reported
valuation of i. Specially, in the single-item setting, the pay-
ment in the first stage of the highest bidder is the second
highest reported valuation. Let mj be the jth highest bidder
among all the agents V . The redistributed money is vˆm3n for
the highest bidder and the second highest bidder, and vˆm2n
for the others. Consequently, all the agents share the surplus
and the rewards are independent of their reported valuation.
Although the Cavallo mechanism is IR and ABB, we then
show that it may run a deficit and agents may be not willing
to diffuse the information in social networks.
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Figure 1: (a) An example of running a deficit; (b) An exam-
ple of disincentivizing the diffusion.
Proposition 1. The Cavallo mechanism runs a deficit.
Proof. We prove the proposition by showing a counter ex-
ample in Figure 1(a). Since agent c is the only one with pos-
itive valuation, the mechanism allocates the item to her. For
agent b and d, their participation will not affect the result,
thus they will pay nothing in the first auction stage. For agent
c, if she does not participate in the mechanism, no one else
will gain the item, thus her payment is also zero. For agent a,
if she quits the mechanism, agent c will not be involved in,
so her payment is−1. Since there is only one positive-utility
agent, all the agents will be redistributed nothing. Thus we
have S(θˆ) =
∑
i∈V pi(θˆ) = −1, which runs a deficit.
Proposition 2. The Cavallo mechanism disincentivizes the
agents to diffuse the information.
Proof. By showing a counter example in Figure 1(b), we
can easily prove the proposition. As agent c is the highest
bidder, she keeps the item and pays the second highest val-
uation pV CGc (θˆ) = vˆb = 3. Then in the redistribution stage,
all these 5 agents will share the surplus. For agent b and c,
SV CGb = S
V CG
c = vˆa = 2, then p
re
b (θˆ) = p
re
c (θˆ) = 2/5.
For agent a, d and e, SV CGa = S
V CG
d = S
V CG
e = vˆb = 3,
then prea (θˆ) = p
re
d (θˆ) = p
re
e (θˆ) = 3/5. However, if a
stops inviting d and c stops inviting e, the allocation and
the surplus will remain the same but the number of agents
who share the surplus will decrease. Then prea (θˆ
′) = 3/3 =
1 > prea (θˆ) and p
re
c (θˆ
′) = 2/3 > prec (θˆ). Thus, the Cavallo
mechanism disincentivizes the agents’ diffusion.
Therefore, owing to the special constraint of social net-
works, extending the Cavallo mechanism simply is not fea-
sible. In the following section, we will introduce our novel
mechanism with all the desirable properties satisfied.
Redistribution Mechanism in Trees
To tackle the challenges on networks, we propose a network-
based redistribution mechanism (NRM) which satisfies all
the desirable properties mentioned before. In this section,
we will first start with a special type network, tree structures,
which provides a clearer presentation of the intuition behind.
Later we will generalize our mechanism on common graphs.
Definition 8. Given a tree graph G = (V,E) and a feasible
reported type profile θˆ of all the agents, for each agent i, j ∈
V if there exists a simple path from the seller s to j through i
and di < dj , we say i is j’s ancestor and j is i’s descendant.
Some basic notations in the mechanism is defined as:
• Let Ai = (a1, · · · , ak) be the ancestor sequence of
agent i, where aj ∈ Ai is an ancestor of agent i and
da1 < da2 < · · · < dak .
• Let Gi = (Vi, Ei) be the subtree of agent i if Gi is
a tree consisting of i and all its descendants in G. Let
ni = |Vi| be the number of agents in Gi.
• LetBaj = rcaj−1\aj be the sibling set of agent aj ∈ Ai,
where all the agents in Baj has the same parent as aj .
• Let vˆ(1)D denote the highest reported valuation among
all the agents in any set D.
That is, for each agent i ∈ V , she cannot join in the mech-
anism if any agent in her ancestor sequence Ai does not dif-
fuse the information. Besides, without the invitation of agent
i, any agent in her subtree Vi cannot receive the information.
Algorithm 1 Network-based Redistribution Mechanism
Require:
A feasible type profile θˆ ∈ F(θ) and the item owner o;
1: construct the tree G = (V,E) by θˆ;
2: identify the highest bidder h ∈ arg maxi∈V vˆi;
3: find the ancestor sequence Ah;
4: find the sibling set Bi for each agent i ∈ Ah ∪ {h};
5: set A = (o,Ah, h) = (a0, a1, · · · , ak, ak+1);
6: initialize pii = 0, Ri = 0 and pi = 0 for each agent i;
7: initialize pauca0 = 0 and S(θˆ) = 0;
8: for each aj in (a1, · · · , ak+1) do
9: paucaj = vˆ
(1)
V \Vaj ;
10: Saj = p
auc
aj − paucaj−1 ;
11: X = Baj ∪ aj ;
12: nX =
∑
q∈X nq;
13: for each k ∈ X do
14: h′ ∈ arg maxi∈V \Vk vˆi;
15: find Ah′ and A′ = (o,Ah′ , h′);
16: S−k =
{
vˆ
(1)
V \{Va′
j
∪Vk} − paucaj−1 if aj−1=a′j−1∈A′
0 otherwise
;
17: Rk =
nk
nX
· S−k;
18: pk = −Rk;
19: end for
20: Update surplus S(θˆ) = S(θˆ)+Saj−
∑
k∈Baj∪aj Rk;
21: if vˆaj ≥ vˆ(1)V \Vaj then
22: piaj = 1;
23: paj = vˆ
(1)
V \Vaj −Raj ;
24: break;
25: end if
26: end for
27: Return pii and pi for each agent i and S(θˆ) for the owner;
Now we will propose our NRM in Trees. The detailed
procedure is given in Algorithm 1.
Intuitively, although the network-based redistribution
mechanism is centralized, it can be viewed as a sequential
procedure. The item passes through the ancestor sequence
of the highest bidder h and each agent aj ∈ A ∪ {h} is re-
quired to pay the highest reported valuation without her par-
ticipation for either passing or keeping the item. The item
is allocated to the first agent whose valuation is higher than
or equal to her required payment. The money each agent
paid first compensates the last ancestor’s payment and the
remaining part will be redistributed among her siblings and
herself. The money redistributed to agent i is the new re-
quired payment difference multiplied by the percentage of
agents in i’s subtree over all the agents in the subtrees of
the ancestor and its siblings considered, which is a mono-
tone increasing function to the number of their descendants.
The more their descendants are, the more they will be redis-
tributed, which incentivizes the agents’ diffusion. The rest
money which is not redistributed will be given to the owner
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Figure 2: (a) The ancestor sequence of agent q and their sib-
lings; (b)(c)(d) A running process of NRM in Trees.
as the surplus. Note that NRM is a centralized mechanism
and all the operation process is run by the owner. Therefore,
only the winner in NRM is the one who is required to pay
the money to the owner while the ancestor sequence of the
winner and their siblings will be redistributed rewards.
We take Figure 2 as an example. In Figure 2(a), the high-
est bidder is agent q and the ancestor sequence is Aq =
{b, g, l}, which are colored in green. Those purple nodes are
siblings of the ancestors, i.e., Bb = {a, c}, Bg = {f, h}
and Bl = {k,m}. Figure 2(b), 2(c)and 2(d) shows a run-
ning process of NRM, where each subfigure represents the
computational process for each step. For each subfigure, the
nodes in grey are the ancestor and its siblings we focus on in
this step, and the nodes in red circle are the highest bidder in
the subtree of the ancestor or its siblings. The value P auc on
the left top is the required payment for the ancestor and the
red arrows represents the payment transfer. In the first step in
Figure 2(b), the required payment for agent b is the highest
reported valuation without her participation paucb = vˆi = 10.
Since she is the first one in the ancestor sequence, the pay-
ment paucb can be directly used to redistribute among the sib-
lings and herself. The total number of agents in the subtrees
of a, b and c is 16. For agent a, without her participation the
new required payment is also 10 and the number of agents
in her subtree is na = 4, thus the money redistributed to her
is Ra = 4∗1016 = 2.5. For agent b, the new required payment
becomes 8 if she quits the mechanism and nb = 8, thus the
money redistributed is Rb = 8∗816 = 4. Similarly, we have
Rc =
4∗8
16 = 2. Then the surplus p
auc
b − Ra − Rb − Rc =
10 − 2.5 − 4 − 2 = 1.5 will be given to the owner. In
the second step in Figure 2(c), we have paucg = 17. Since
paucb = 10, the money first compensates agent b’s payment.
Then the payment difference paucg − paucb = 17 − 10 = 7
will be redistributed among f , g and h. For each f , g and
h, the new required payment difference without their partic-
ipation is also 7. Thus, we have Rf = Rh = 1∗77 = 1 and
Rg =
5∗7
7 = 5. In this step the surplus to owner is zero since
paucg − paucb −Rf −Rg −Rh = 0. In the third step in Fig-
ure 2(d), paucl = 17 is equal to p
auc
g . Thus the money will all
be used to compensate agent g’s payment and remain noth-
ing for redistribution. Thus we have Rk = Rl = Rm = 0.
Since vˆl = 18 > paucl , the item will be allocated to agent
l. Till now, the NRM runs over. The winner is agent l and
the surplus is S = 1.5. Compared to the classical Cavallo
mechanism, the owner allocates the item to agent b with so-
cial welfare v′b = 7 and only three agents a, b and c have
positive utilities while in NRM the social welfare is 18 and
7 agents have positive utilities. Therefore, our mechanism is
more efficient and more agents have positive utilities.
Properties of NRM
In what follows, we show that our NRM satisfies all the de-
sirable properties of IR, IC, ND and ABB in trees. Also, the
allocation is more efficient than traditional Cavallo mecha-
nism among the neighbours.
Theorem 1. The network-based redistribution mechanism
in trees is individually rational.
Proof. According to the algorithm of NRM, for each sib-
ling i of ancestors, they are not required to pay money and
they will receive the money redistributed. Thus we have
ui(θi, θˆ) = pii(θˆ)vi − pi(θˆ) = −pi(θˆ) = Ri(θˆ) ≥ 0. For
each ancestor i of the winner, although they are required
to pay money for either passing or keeping the item, their
payment will be compensated by the next ancestor in the
sequence. Thus they will be only redistributed the money
from the mechanism, i.e., ui(θi, θˆ) = pii(θˆ)vi − pi(θˆ) =
−pi(θˆ) = Ri(θˆ) ≥ 0. For the winner w of the item, her val-
uation must be greater than or equal to her required payment
according to the allocation condition. Together with the re-
distributed money, her utility is uw(θw, θˆ) = piw(θˆ)vw −
pw(θˆ) = vw − paucw + Ri(θˆ) ≥ Ri(θˆ) ≥ 0. All the other
agents pay nothing. Thus, agents’ utilities in NRM are non-
negative and the mechanism is individually rational.
Theorem 2. The network-based redistribution mechanism
in trees is incentive compatible.
Proof. As defined in the extended IC, all agents are required
not only to report their truthful valuation but also to invite all
their neighbours. Here we prove the theorem in two steps.
First, fix whatever valuation for each agent, we prove that
inviting all the neighbours is the dominant strategy. Next,
fix whatever neighbours invited by each agent, we prove
that reporting the truthful valuation is the dominant strategy.
Thereby, for each agent, both reporting the truthful valuation
and inviting all the neighbours is the dominant strategy.
In NRM, all the agents can be divided into four categories:
the winner, winner’s ancestors, siblings of the ancestors and
the others. Only the agents in the first three categories will
gain non-zero utilities.
For the winner w, her utility is uw(θw, θˆ) = piw(θˆ)vw −
pw(θˆ) = vw − paucw + Rw. First, assume that her reported
valuation is fixed and the neighbours she invited is rˆw ⊂ rw.
According to the allocation condition, no matter how many
neighbours she invites, she will be still the winner since her
valuation is at least equal to the required payment. The term
vw − paucw remains the same. However, since Rw is a mono-
tone increasing function to the number of the descendants,
Rw will decrease if inviting fewer neighbours, which leads
to a lower utility. Next, assume that her neighbours invited
is fixed and her reported valuation is vˆw 6= vw. If she is still
the winner, her utility remains the same since it is not related
to her reported valuation. If she becomes an ancestor of the
new winner or the siblings of the ancestor, her utility will
only consist the redistributed part Rw ≤ vw − paucw + Rw,
which is lower than the utility of being the winner.
For the winner’s ancestor i, her utility is ui(θi, θˆ) =
pii(θˆ)vi − pi(θˆ) = Ri. First, assume that her reported val-
uation is fixed and the neighbours she invited is rˆi ⊂ ri.
According to the allocation condition, no matter how many
neighbours she invites, she cannot be the winner since her
valuation is lower than the required payment, i.e., vw <
paucw . If she is still the ancestor or becomes a sibling, her
utility will decrease after inviting fewer neighbours since
the total amount of the money to be redistributed will not
increase and the Rw is a monotone increasing function to
the number of the descendants. Next, assume that her neigh-
bours invited is fixed and her reported valuation is vˆi 6= vi.
She has no chance to be the sibling. If she becomes the win-
ner, her utility will be vi − pauci +Ri < Ri, which is lower
than that of reporting truthfully. If she is still the ancestor,
her utility will not change no matter what valuation she re-
ports.
For the sibling of the ancestors i, her utility is ui(θi, θˆ) =
pii(θˆ)vi − pi(θˆ) = Ri. First, assume that her reported valu-
ation is fixed and the neighbours she invited is rˆi ⊂ ri. She
has no chance to be the winner or the ancestor according to
the allocation condition. If she is still the sibling, her util-
ity will decrease after misreporting since the total amount of
the money to be redistributed will not increase and the Rw
is a monotone increasing function to the number of the de-
scendants. Next, assume that her neighbours invited is fixed
and her reported valuation is vˆi 6= vi. She has no chance to
be an ancestor. If she becomes the winner, her required pay-
ment will be the highest valuation without her participation,
which is higher than her valuation. Thus her utility will de-
crease because vi−pauci +Ri < Ri. If she is still the sibling,
her utility remains unchanged.
For any other agent i, her utility is 0. First, assume that her
reported valuation is fixed and the neighbours she invited is
rˆi ⊂ ri. The allocation will not change and she cannot be-
come the winner, the ancestor or the sibling. So she will still
gain nothing. Next, assume that her neighbours invited is
fixed and her reported valuation is vˆi 6= vi. The only pos-
sible way to gain something through misreporting valuation
is to be the winner. However, the money she is required to
pay must be higher than her valuation and the money redis-
tributed to her must be zero. Thus her utility is negative.
Accordingly, NRM is incentive compatible since all the
agents have no incentive to either misreporting their valua-
tion or inviting fewer neighbours.
Theorem 3. The network-based redistribution mechanism
in trees runs no deficit.
Proof. According to the process of NRM, in each step, the
ancestor ai pays the money required paucai = vˆ
(1)
V \Vai and
shares the remaining part after compensation paucai − paucai−1
among X = Bai ∪ ai. The total money redistributed is∑
k∈X
Rk =
∑
k∈X
nk
nX
· S−k
≤
∑
k∈X
nk
nX
· (paucai − paucai−1)
= paucai − paucai−1
Thus, the required payment can cover the compensation
and the money redistributed. So NRM runs no deficit.
Theorem 4. The network-based redistribution mechanism
in trees is asymptotically budget-balanced.
Proof. In each step, the money is redistributed among the
ancestor ai and her siblings Bai . Let the X = Bai ∪{ai} =
{x1, x2, · · · , xm}, where vˆ(1)Vx1 ≥ vˆ
(1)
Vx2
≥ · · · ≥ vˆ(1)Vxm . The
amount of the money redistributed is∑
k∈X Rk =
∑
k∈X
nk
nX
· S−k
=
nx1
nX
·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx3 − p
auc
ai−1) +
nx2
nX
·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx3 − p
auc
ai−1)
+
nx3
nX
·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx2 − p
auc
ai−1)+· · ·+ nxmnX ·max(0, vˆ
(1)
Vx2
− paucai−1)
=λ ·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx3 − p
auc
ai−1) + (1− λ) ·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx2 − p
auc
ai−1)
where λ = (nx1 + nx2)/nX .
As the number of participating agents n goes to ∞, the
surplus for this step is
lim
n→+∞(p
auc
ai − paucai−1 −
∑
k∈X Rk)
= lim
n→+∞(max(vˆ
(1)
Vx2
, paucai−1)− paucai−1
−λ·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx3 − p
auc
ai−1)− (1− λ)·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx2 − p
auc
ai−1))
= lim
n→+∞(max(0, vˆ
(1)
Vx2
− paucai−1)
−λ·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx3 − p
auc
ai−1)− (1− λ)·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx2 − p
auc
ai−1))
= lim
n→+∞(λ·max(0, vˆ
(1)
Vx2
− paucai−1)− λ·max(0, vˆ(1)Vx3 − p
auc
ai−1))
= lim
n→+∞
nx1+nx2
nX
·(max(0, vˆ(1)Vx2−p
auc
ai−1)−max(0, vˆ(1)Vx3−p
auc
ai−1))
=0
Thus in each step the surplus is asymptotically zero, so the
NRM is asymptotically budget-balanced.
Theorem 5. The network-based redistribution mechanism
in trees is at least as efficient as Cavallo mechanism among
neighbours.
Proof. According to the allocation condition, the winner is
the agent whose reported valuation satisfies vˆw ≥ paucw =
vˆ
(1)
V \Vw ≥ vˆ
(1)
ro . Thus, NRM is at least as efficient as Cavallo
mechanism among the owner’s neighbours.
o va vba b
Figure 3: The worst case for efficiency.
It seems that Theorem 5 is not that strong since there
are no further guarantees for the efficiency except for the
improvement compared to the Cavallo mechanism among
the neighbours. However, even if we ignore redistribution
and only consider weak budget balance (and IC, IR), effi-
ciency approximation has not been found yet (Li et al. 2017;
Li et al. 2019). Consider a simple line graph in Figure 3,
where o is the resource owner, a has two neighbors o and
b, and a and b’s valuations are va and vb and va < vb. If
a does not invite b, a wins the resource and pays zero, so
a will only invite b if a’s reward is at least va. If a invites
b, to achieve efficiency, b wins and her payment should be
not more than vb for IR. To achieve no-deficit, b should pay
at least what a receives. Eventually, their payments depend
on their valuations, which seems to violate IC. That said, this
simple setting is somewhat equivalent to the bilateral trading
setting of one seller and one buyer studied by Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) where a behaves like the seller and b is
the buyer. If this is true, then their well-known impossibil-
ity theorem holds here (i.e. we cannot have efficiency, IC, IR
and no-deficit at the same time). Even in bilateral trading set-
tings, we haven’t seen good no-deficit examples to approxi-
mate efficiency. The well-known example is McAfee’s trade
reduction for multiple buyers and multiple sellers, where ef-
ficiency is sacrificed to remove deficit, but the efficiency loss
is diminished when the number of traders increases (McAfee
1992). However, it still does not guarantee a lower bound of
efficiency in general. In the worst case when there is only
one buyer and one seller, it has no efficiency guarantee.
Redistribution Mechanism in Graphs
In the previous section, we only studied the mechanism in
tree structures. In real life, most social networks are common
graphs. Hence in this section, we extend our NRM to more
general cases without sacrificing all desirable properties.
Different from the tree cases, we extend the definitions
and basic notations for graph settings.
Definition 9. Given a common graph G = (V,E) and a
feasible reported type profile θˆ of all the agents, for each
agent i, j ∈ V if all the paths from o to j have to pass i, we
say i is j’s ancestor and j is i’s descendant.
• Let Ai = (a1, · · · , ak) be the ancestor sequence of
agent i.
• Let Gi = (Vi, Ei) be the subgraph of agent i.
• LetBaj = rcaj−1\aj be the sibling set of agent aj ∈ Ai.
That is, an ancestor aj ∈ Ai for agent i ∈ V is a cut-
point from the seller to i. The subgraph of agent i are those
who cannot receive the information without i’s invitation.
The siblings of an ancestor aj are the child neighbours of
ancestor aj−1 except aj herself.
Then the NRM can be simply extended in graphs by up-
dating the definitions of the notations above in Algorithm 1.
Intuitively, the network-based redistribution mechanism
in graphs is a generalization of that in trees. The sibling set
who share the money with an ancestor are the child neigh-
bours of the last ancestor. Seemingly, it is quite different
from the ancestor’s brother neighbours with the same parent
in tree cases. Actually, in tree structures, the ancestor herself
is also one of the child neighbours of the last ancestor, which
can be viewed as a special case of the common graphs.
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Figure 4: (a) The ancestor sequence of agent r and their sib-
lings; (b)(c) A running process of NRM in graphs.
Also an example is given to illustrate the mechanism.
In Figure 4(a), the highest bidder is agent r. According to
the definition, the green nodes are the ancestors and purple
nodes are their siblings, i.e., Ar = {g, p}, Bg = {a, b, c}
and Bp = {j, k, l,m}. In the running example in Fig-
ure 4(b) 4(c), first for agent g, her required payment paucg =
vˆi = 12 will all be used to redistribute among a, b, c and
g. The total number of agents in the subgraph of all a, b, c
and g is 3 + 1 + 2 + 9 = 15. If a quits the mechanism,
d and e will be not able to receive the information and b
will be the new ancestor with payment 12. Thus we have
Ra =
3∗12
15 = 2.4. If b quits the mechanism, only herself will
be out of the network and a will be the new ancestor with
payment 12. Thus we have Rb = 1∗1215 = 0.8. Similarly, we
have Rc = 2∗915 = 1.2 and Rg =
9∗9
15 = 5.4. The surplus to
the owner in this step is 12−2.4−0.8−1.2−5.4 = 2.2. In the
same way, the required payment for agent p is paucp = 15 and
the remaining money after compensation is paucp −paucg = 3.
Then the money redistributed to each agent is Rj = Rk =
Rl = Rm =
1∗3
6 = 0.5 and Rp =
2∗3
6 = 1. The surplus
is 0 and p will keep the item since vˆp = 16 ≥ 15 = paucp .
Till now, the mechanism runs over. The winner is agent p,
the social welfare is v′p = 16 and the total surplus is 2.2.
Since the network-based redistribution mechanism in
graphs is a generalization of that in trees, we can easily ob-
tain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The network-based redistribution mechanism
in graphs runs no deficit and is IR, IC, ABB and at least as
efficient as Cavallo mechanism among neighbours.
Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the redistribution mechanism
design problem in social networks, where the owner wants
to allocate one item and hopes the wealth maintained among
the agents. The objective is to incentivize agents participated
to invite all their neighbours to the mechanism so that the
owner can make the allocation more efficient. The classical
Cavallo mechanism performs well in the traditional setting;
however, it may lead to a deficit and disincentivize the agents
to diffuse the information. To overcome the challenge, we
propose a novel network-based redistribution mechanism
which incentivizes agents to invite all their neighbours. The
mechanism works not only for the tree structures but also
for the common graphs. Moreover, the mechanism satisfies
all the desirable properties of individual rationality, incen-
tive compatibility, asymptotically budget-balance and non-
deficit. The allocation is also more efficient.
Our work has many interesting aspects for further in-
vestigation. We only consider the single-item situation in
this paper, so it may be a challenge to extend the mecha-
nism for multiple items (Zhao et al. 2018). Since the wealth
is redistributed among a particular group of agents in our
mechanism, another valuable direction can be finding a way
to redistribute more fairly. In addition, it is also worth-
while to generalize our mechanism for public project prob-
lems (Clarke 1971; Guo 2019).
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